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Migration, Trade, Capital and Development:  Substitutes, Complements and Policies
Gustav Ranis
ABSTRACT
Migration of the unskilled clearly benefits the origin country, mainly due to the flow of
remittances but also if the departure of some raises the ability of others to migrate. This depends
on whether trade is a complement or a substitute for migration.  The impact of such flows on the
destination country is more ambiguous, although most research indicates that wages and
employment are not likely to be seriously affected.
Migration of the skilled is ambiguous with respect to the origin country since the impact
of brain drain on local development must be weighed against the signaling effect for additional
education plus the contribution of remittances.  With respect to the destination country, the
inflow of skilled labor is generally considered an unambiguous plus as it contributes to the
enhancement of productivity. 
The paper concludes with policy recommendations aimed at seizing the opportunities
arising from the fact that international migration remains the most constrained element of
globalization.
Keywords: Migration, Trade, Globalization
JEL Codes: O11, O15
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Migration, Trade, Capital and Development:  Substitutes, Complements and 
Policies 
 
Gustav Ranis 
Yale University 
I. Introduction 
 The post-war era is, of course, not the first experience the world has had with 
globalization in all its dimensions.  The current episode can, however, be 
distinguished from its 19th century predecessor by its scale, i.e. a world of 6 billion 
inhabitants, massive movements of goods, services and capital – as well as by 
continuously falling communication and transport costs, and, last but not least, the 
instantaneous nature of information flows and agent reaction possibilities.  When war 
and inter-war autarky ended in 1945 international trade was first to pick up, followed 
by a renewal of public capital movements (ODA) – first to Europe and subsequently 
to the developing countries – subsequently followed by private portfolio capital and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), quickly dwarfing ODA.  The economic migration of 
people – i.e. excluding refugees and asylum seekers, has lagged substantially behind 
– largely because, despite calls – and considerable action – for the increased freedom 
of trade, capital and associated technology mobility, barriers to the movement of 
people remained high.  It is this dimension of globalization which tends to cause the 
strongest political resistance;  when domestic workers are seen to be threatened by 
some combination of technology change, imports and immigrants it is invariably the 
latter which generates the largest rhetorical and policy response.   
 Nevertheless, pressures for enhanced migration are rising, certainly in the less 
developed origin (O) countries, but also in some quarters of the more developed 
destination (D) countries.  And the very fact that migration has lagged substantially 
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behind the other dimensions of globalization also provides the largest opportunity for 
additional global welfare gains – especially today when further multilateral trade 
liberalization is in considerable doubt.  We will therefore focus on migration and its 
interactions with the other elements of globalization as they impact development.  In 
this context, we will find it useful to distinguish between the costs and benefits 
accruing to the countries of O and D, while differentiating between the movement of 
skilled and unskilled migrants.  Section II concentrates on the movement of unskilled 
and its relation to the other dimensions of globalization, while Section III attempts the 
same with respect to the skilled.  Section IV suggests some conclusions for policy 
within the same broad globalization framework. 
 
II.  Migration of the Unskilled 
 This type of migrant represents the largest potential benefit to global welfare even 
as the distribution of the gains as between O and D countries remains controversial.  
The desire to migrate by both the unemployed, underemployed and those employed at 
very low incomes in the third world is a function of the availability of information, 
geographic distance, the gaps in prospective life-time incomes, plus the perceived 
probability of gaining employment in the D country.  The ability to migrate, on the 
other hand, depends on some combination of family income levels, access to credit 
markets, government support, the extent of diaspora corridors abroad and, of course, 
the level of entry barriers erected by the D countries.  As indicated in Figure 1a 
picturing Mexico as a typical case, we can expect the desire to migrate to dominate 
both the private ability to do so and the D countries level of barriers.  In some O 
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countries, e.g. the Philippines, the government may step in by providing both 
information and financial support, in return for the promise of enhanced remittances 
which tend to shift up both the desire and ability curves. However, to the extent that 
immigration barriers remain the dominant constraint, i.e. X marks the actual level of 
migration, there will be increasing pressure to attempt illegal entry.   
 
 The benefits of unskilled migration to the O country are clear.  Given the fact that 
it is likely to find itself in a labor surplus condition, the withdrawal of even 
substantial numbers of unskilled workers from rural or, more likely, urban informal 
sector pursuits is not likely to affect output significantly; indeed, given that there is 
likely to be family subsidization of underemployed relatives, plus a real chance for 
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positive adjustments in technology made possible as a consequence of such 
departures, productivity is likely to rise and poverty to decline.  
 There are other substantial benefits accruing to the O country.  Chief of these is 
the receipt of the remittances which not only substantially enhance family incomes 
but also have important dynamic spill-over effects.  Such receipts are likely to 
encourage additional entrepreneurial and investment activities by those left behind 
and, probably as important, innovative activities by returning migrants who have had 
new windows and contacts opened to them while abroad, especially since the D 
country is likely to be a more advanced market economy.  But even in relatively 
advanced developing O countries such as Pakistan, sending temporary migrants to the 
Middle East, evidence from its North-West Frontier Province has indicated the 
important entrepreneurial, human capital contribution of returned migrants, along 
with their financial capital.  
 Mexico, for example, receives $20-25 billion in remittances annually, exceeding 
FDI flows ($18 billion in 2004), and estimated to provide 20-30% of her micro-
enterprise capital.1   In 2000 Mexico’s unskilled earnings gap with the U.S. was 
roughly 6 times.2  An individual’s average annual gain by moving to the U.S. is thus 
estimated at $10,000 which, over a working life, amounts to a roughly $250,000 
differential, clearly undergirding the desire to migrate - substantially above either the 
ability to migrate or the legal barrier put up by the U.S.  The Philippine case is not too 
different, except that here, as noted above, the government has been more directly 
involved in supporting emigration via the provision of information and credit 
                                                 
1 Woodruff, Christopher and Rene Zenteno, (2001). 
2 R.B. Freeman, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring, 2006.   
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advances.  Between 1975 and 1986 the number of Philippine contract workers 
moving to other parts of Asia increased from 4,200 to 76,650 and those moving to the 
Middle East from 1, 552 to 262,758.3  In 2003, remittances amounted to 10.2% of 
GDP, up from 2.7% in 1990.4   Globally, remittances have reached $150 billion in 
20045, almost 3 times ODA, with an estimated additional $50 billion underreported.  
In some O countries remittance flows have risen to 40% of export earnings and 20% 
of GDP. These flows have clearly helped reduce poverty rates and had an equalizing 
effect on the distribution of income. 
 Remittances, as well as other types of capital inflows, including ODA and private 
capital, of course, substitute for unskilled labor migration.  To the extent such inflows 
generate equitable growth, the income gaps between the O and D countries will 
decline and the desire to migrate will fall even as the ability rises.  If, after some time, 
the country is successful in reaching East Asian NIC status, or Kuznets’ epoch of 
“modern economic growth”, the D country’s import barriers will at some point, i.e. 
beyond X, no longer be binding (see Figure 1b).  
 
 
  
  
 
 
                                                 
3 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration 
4 International Organization for Migration. 
5 Maimbo, Samuel Munzele and Dilip Ratha  (eds) (2005), Remittances: Development Impact and Future 
Prospects, World Bank.  
  6
 
 Remittances have additional advantages in comparison with other types of capital 
inflows.  For one, they are likely to be more dependable, fluctuating less; for another, 
they are likely to be counter-cyclical, i.e. increasing in times of economic decline or 
natural disasters, while other types of private capital often act cyclically.   Moreover, 
remittances are less likely to cause Dutch Disease problems, either of the narrow or 
the extended variety.  With respect to the traditional, narrow variety, since 
remittances are likely to be more broadly dispersed, frequently ending up in the hands 
of rural and urban informal sector families, they are less likely to cause a 
strengthening of the currency and a shift from exportable to non-traded goods, 
especially if they are used for entrepreneurial investment rather than purely 
consumption activities.  Turning to the extended Dutch Disease variety, which we 
define as the political economy consequence of capital inflows which tend to take the 
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pressure off and thus permit governments to actually avoid reforms, the decentralized 
character of remittances again renders them comparatively much less likely than 
foreign aid to be a source of reform obstruction and the object of rent-seeking and 
corruption. 
 The most important substitute for unskilled labor migration is, of course, trade 
which is able to incorporate such labor in the form of labor intensive commodities 
and send it to the D country “under the radar.”  Unfortunately, while trade has 
virtually exploded in the post-war era, early liberalization efforts have recently tended 
to run out of steam and neo-protectionist measures, including anti-dumping 
provisions and exemptions from preferences,  targeted especially on textiles, shoes 
and other labor intensive commodities, have been on the rise. 
 In addition to trade and capital movements, an additional substitute for unskilled 
migration is the inflow of technology, especially if it is adaptable to the more labor 
abundant environment of the O country and thus enhances the potential of keeping 
unskilled labor productively employed at home or embodied in exports.  Indeed, I 
would place much more weight, either in discussing the impact of migration, of trade 
or of capital, on such dynamic dimensions rather than on static comparative 
advantage and efficiency criteria. 
 In summary, various other dimensions of globalization can act as substitutes for 
unskilled labor migration.  Moreover, the economic benefits of such migration for the 
O country are overwhelmingly clear.  On the negative side of the ledger, we can 
record the not inconsiderable social costs incurred as a result of prolonged family 
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separations as well as the risks of exploitation and ill treatment of migrants, 
temporary or permanent, in the D country.   
 Turning to the benefits and costs of unskilled migration with respect to the D 
country, the situation is somewhat less clear.  The arrival of “cheap labor” from 
abroad is usually greeted by much more political flak than the arrival of “cheap 
goods” incorporating “cheap labor.”  Yet both serve the interests of dispersed D 
country consumers since the former may encourage the survival, at least for a time, of 
relatively “sick” or defensive industries, while the latter directly enhances consumer 
welfare. The other benefits, increasingly recognized, especially in the rich D countries 
suffering from low birth rates, is that large-scale migration by overwhelmingly young 
workers is necessary to help support the welfare and safety net packages of the 
indigenous elderly population.  We can safely assume that such pressures in the future 
will be even greater because of continuously falling birth rates and rising life 
expectancies.   It is, moreover, a fact that there are jobs, at the lower end of the 
occupational totem pole, mostly in agriculture and personal services, that D country 
workers are reluctant to take up and which have been increasingly filled by unskilled 
immigrants.  In this important sense, unskilled immigrants are substitutes for capital, 
increase indigenous labor force participation rates and thus enhance the productive 
capacity of the D country. 
 Nevertheless, resistance to the admission of unskilled migrants continues to be 
formidable in almost all D countries.  The key objection, emanating mainly from 
unions and their political allies, focuses on the cost, in terms of lowering indigenous 
unskilled worker wages, as we would expect from economic theory.  Nevertheless, 
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what empirical evidence we have casts doubt on the robustness of this effect.  David 
Card, for example, examining such national experiments as the Mariel boat lift and 
Algerian inflows into France, found only relatively minor negative wage impacts on 
earlier migrants and virtually none on indigenous unskilled workers.6  All in all, from 
a global welfare point of view, unskilled migration from poor to rich countries seems 
to have large upside benefits for both sides, yet it is clearly the most controversial, 
and the most restricted, of all globalization flows.  Here politics and both intentional 
and unintentional misperceptions decidedly trump economics. 
 
III. Migration of the Skilled 
 When we attempt to examine the costs and benefits for both the O and D 
countries of high talent labor migration the story is , of course, quite different.  The 
benefit to the O country is still the contribution such migrants make to the volume of 
remittances, although the spending pattern of these somewhat more well-to-do left 
behind families is likely to be somewhat different, i.e. more additional consumption 
rather than investment oriented.  Still, on the benefit side, skilled migrants are likely 
to stimulate others in the O country to seek additional education in preparation for 
future migration, thus increasing the average level of education.  Moreover, there is a 
good chance that such migrants will ultimately return, once the home country has 
reached a certain level of income and opportunity.  This has certainly proven to hold 
in the cases of Korea, Taiwan and India with engineers, IT specialists and others 
leaving Silicon Valley and its equivalents, returning home– sometimes after many 
                                                 
6 David Card (2001).  “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher 
Immigration,” Journal of Labor Economics, 19, 22-64.   
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years – and contributing in a major way to the growth of high tech industries in the O 
countries. 
 But there are also costs to be considered, especially in the short run, when a poor 
O country loses valuable human capital on which it has invested substantial 
educational expenditures.  This perverse  movement of human capital – from poor to 
rich countries – has occasioned much discussion and policy debates in the past, 
including Bhagwati’s suggestion of an exit tax and equally unimplemented efforts to 
restrict long-term stays abroad by legal/contractual means.   
 While high talent manpower is clearly needed to support the O country’s 
development efforts, all too frequently the educational structure yields outputs not 
really suited to the needs of the contemporary economy, creating a mismatch, with 
potentially explosive political consequences, e.g. the well-known case of the highly 
skilled unemployed in Sri Lanka.  In such circumstances, unless the domestic 
educational production function can be reformed so that the output is better suited to 
the developing country’s needs, emigration may provide the only possible escape 
valve.  On the other hand, there are cases, including the Philippines, where it is 
official policy to generate skilled labor, in this instance doctors and nurses, 
specifically for purposes of export and remittances, seen not as a cost but as a benefit 
to society. 
 Turning to the D country situation, while unskilled immigrants, as we have seen, 
can generally be viewed as substitutes for capital, skilled labor is likely to constitute a 
complement to the rich country’s capital, both physical and human.  While D country 
immigration barriers are therefore usually friendlier to skilled immigrants than to the 
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unskilled, empirical evidence indicates that the negative impact of such arrivals on 
the incomes of their indigenous counterparts is actually likely to be larger than what 
we found to be the case for the unskilled.  Unless the skilled arrivals fill a particular, 
relatively poorly serviced, non-competitive niche or, in a dynamic context, are in a 
position to help generate entirely new economic activities, they ultimately represent a 
greater threat to the income levels of their domestic counterparts than in the unskilled 
case.  Nevertheless, given their modest number and the relative absence of union 
opposition to their arrival, the overall political resistance is likely to be much lower; 
moreover, the recognition that they help overcome specific shortages and/or provide 
entrepreneurial energy and generate precious technology change, especially in the 
knowledge industries, is more likely to carry the day, certainly in the more dynamic D 
countries.  In the case of the U.S., for example, it has been estimated that a 10% 
increase in the number of foreign graduate students raises patent applications by 
4.7%, and we all know of the contribution of Chinese and Indian migrants to the 
science and technology explosions in the Silicon Valley. 
 
IV. Conclusions for Policy 
 It should be abundantly clear that the enhanced South-North migration of both 
unskilled and skilled individuals would not only increase global welfare but is almost 
certain to benefit both the O and D countries.  At present, since migration is clearly 
the most constrained of the various dimensions of globalization, it also offers the 
greatest potential for future gains.  This potential emanates not only from the fact that 
it is a static substitute or complement to the other elements of globalization but also 
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because, as we have noted above, it also has a potentially important dynamic catalytic 
impact. 
 International trade has initially exploded, rising 25 times since 1950, much faster 
than per capita income.  Even if the Doha Round cannot be resuscitated, we can 
expect trade to continue to grow – if at somewhat lower rates - since it is generally 
recognized to represent a positive sum game – even if the gains are not equitably 
distributed as between North and South.  The arrivals of foreign capital, shifting from 
ODA in the immediate post-war era to private flows, can also be expected to continue 
to expand – and the same can be said of the transfer of technology, even though trade-
related property rights issues do still need to be sorted out. 
 The most obvious policy conclusion, but also the most difficult to implement, 
would, of course, be for the D countries to lower their barriers to migration, 
especially those curbing the unskilled labor variety.  When domestic producers and 
labor  unions in the so-called sunset industries feel threatened by a combination of 
technology change, competitive imports and the arrival of migrant workers, it is 
usually the latter, more visible and threatening, which is likely to bear the brunt of 
restrictive actions.  While, as already mentioned, politics here is usually in a good 
position to trump rationality, just as with respect to the traditional emphasis on 
reciprocity in trade liberalization negotiations, nowhere else is the problem as 
pronounced as in the realm of international migration.  The resistance is usually more 
modest with reference to the flow of skilled immigrants since they can be defended as 
likely to be net helpful to the local economy. Even as the pressures mount to accept 
more immigrants, whether for reasons of demographics, business interests,  
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entrepreneurial renewal, or job characteristics, most rich D countries, e.g. Japan and 
the U.S., prefer to close one eye to illegal immigration rather than to lower official 
barriers.  This holds generally in spite of the serious humanitarian and rule-of-law 
related side-effects.  The recently passed U.S. immigration legislation, focused on 
penalties and border fences, can be seen as a response to this general attitude.  
 Multilateral negotiations to reduce migration barriers have never been tried.  
Given the convergence of issues relating to trade and immigration, such a function 
might sensibly be lodged in the WTO.  With services now included in WTO 
negotiations this would represent a rational extension - especially when migration is 
increasingly perceived as of potential benefit to both rich and poor countries.  Though 
there are legitimate worries about the further overloading of that body, this would 
appear to be a better option than working with the toothless International 
Organization for Migration - or creating yet another new look-alike institution. 
 Secondly, as the 2005 report of the UN’s Global Commission on National 
Immigration emphasized, member countries’ “best practice” related to guest worker 
arrangements could be generalized.  For example, it recommended multilateral 
consideration of a South Korean program forcing temporary migrants to deposit a 
proportion of their earnings in a special savings account which is forfeited if 
“temporary” threatens to become “permanent.”  
 A third policy option would be the installation of a much more effective trade 
adjustment assistance program in D countries so that, given the simultaneous arrival 
of immigrants and imports, affected domestic workers could be retrained and actually 
moved into “sunrise industries.”  Discussion during the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial 
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Conference in December ’05 suggested focusing ODA more specifically on the 
facilitation of trade. Such an initiative could include moving towards a Global Trade 
and Migration Adjustment Assistance Program, administered by the World Bank or 
the WTO, financed mainly by D countries’ ODA contributions and following 
multilaterally negotiated rules of the game.  Foreign aid spent at home in this fashion 
is likely to yield a higher return to D country taxpayers.   Inevitably, when all is said 
and done, elements of globalization can lead to some job losses in the D countries.  
The reaction has varied from minimal state intervention in the form of a rather 
ineffective adjustment assistance program – plus a rather flexible labor market – in 
the U.S., to substantial public purse support, combined with strict government 
controls over the labor market, in France.  Perhaps the best model may be found in 
Denmark which combines a generous public safety net with a relatively flexible labor 
market.  But since all, especially emerging countries, will not have the same 
budgetary capacity, assistance from outside may be warranted.   But, even in the 
absence of major changes in the international rules of the game, O countries can 
provide systematic information, and even financial support, to potential migrants, 
both temporary and permanent, as for example, in the case of the Philippines.  
Improving credit access may serve to reduce the demand and simultaneously enhance 
the ability of unskilled would-be migrants to move – thus reducing the potentially 
explosive gap previously referred to. 
  One way to be helpful in this regard is by facilitating the flow of 
remittances which, as we have mentioned, can make important financial as well as 
entrepreneurial contributions to the O countries’ development, while incurring much 
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smaller risks than other capital flows with respect to either the narrow or broad 
definition of  the “Dutch Disease.”  Given their increased importance and the even 
more rapidly increasing realization of their importance to both parties, special efforts 
should be made to reduce current exorbitantly high remittance transfer fees in the D 
countries.  
 But, ultimately, the only reliable way to reduce expected lifetime income gaps 
between individuals in the O and D countries is to enhance participatory, i.e. labor 
absorbing, development in the former.  With Mexican immigrants benefiting to the 
extent of approximately $250,000 by migrating to the U.S., while equality of 
outcomes is certainly not required, a reduction of such huge expected income gaps, 
for an individual Mexican and, as important, for her children, undoubtedly is.  And 
that, in turn, of course, requires successful development in the O country, mainly a 
domestic affair, but one that can be assisted from the outside.  How to do this 
effectively extends beyond the scope of this paper.7 
 
                                                 
7 See however, G. Ranis, “Toward the Enhanced Effectiveness of Foreign Aid,” presented at the UNU-
WIDER Conference on Aid, June 16-17, 2006, Helsinki, Finland, to be published. 
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